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Abstract
We analyze the emergence of large-scale education systems in a
framework where growth is associated with changes in the congura-
tion of the economy. We model the incentives that the economic elite
could have (collectively) to accept taxation destined to nance the ed-
ucation of credit-constrained workers. Contrary to previous work, in
our model this incentive does not necessarily arise from a complemen-
tarity between physical and human capital in manufacturing. Instead,
we emphasize the demand for human-capital-intensive services by high-
income groups. Our model seems capable to account for salient features
of the development of Latin America in the 19th century, where, in par-
ticular, land-rich countries such as Argentina established an extensive
public education system and developed a sophisticated service sector
before starting signicant manufacturing activities.
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1 Introduction
Dierences in economic development have been subject to varying interpre-
tations. A traditional, and still relevant literature stressed structural factors,
such as the abundance of natural resources, the specialization in activities
that oer good opportunities for technical improvements, the existence of
high saving propensities, extensive markets or other circumstances that may
encourage a faster pace of technological change (see, among others, Chenery
and Syrquin, 1975; Di Tella and Zymmelman, 1967; Kuznets, 1965; Nurkse,
1961, and Prebisch, 1951). More recently, the emphasis has shifted to social
factors, and especially to the incentive eects of institutions and culture
(see, among others, North, 1981; Landes, 1998; and Acemoglu et al., 2005).
There is clear evidence that incentives (economic, social and political) and
the institutions that mold them matter for development. However, those in-
centives operate in the concrete environment determined by the economy's
conguration and experience. Institutions themselves are inuenced by po-
litical and economic structures, that is, they are endogenously determined.
Thus, a better understanding of the process of economic development re-
quires considering the joint determination of economic structure and social
institutions.
Human capital accumulation is a clear example of this interaction be-
tween institutional and structural factors. In a world with imperfect capital
markets, low-income workers are constrained in their private investment in
education. Thus, the nature (and, more starkly, the presence or absence)
of a public school system critically determines the extent and the evolu-
tion of human capital accumulation. Dierent societies develop dierent
school systems. The social decisions on education are certainly inuenced
by broad political factors, but they also respond to economic considera-
tions and, therefore, they depend on the structure of the economy. In turn,
changes in a society's levels of schooling and literacy would aect its social
structure and, perhaps, the political institutions that determine the educa-
tional institutions themselves.
The United States and Canada developed schooling institutions since
colonial times. By 1850, every northern state of the US had already en-
acted a law strongly encouraging or requiring localities to establish \free
schools", open to all children and supported by general taxes. The rest of
the hemisphere trailed far behind those two countries in education and liter-
acy. Even the most progressive Latin American countries, such as Argentina
and Uruguay, lagged more than fty years behind the U.S. and Canada in
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providing primary schooling and attaining high levels of literacy. Most of
Latin America was unable to achieve these standards until well into the
twentieth century, if then (Mariscal and Sokolo, 2000).
Why did some countries invest heavily in the education of broad segments
of the population while others lagged behind? Galor and Moav (2006) {GM
from now on- provide a very interesting explanation: capitalists, as a group,
may have incentives to invest in the education of the labor force because the
productivity of physical capital in manufacturing production increases with
the input of human skills. That is, capitalists can gain from tax-nancing
the emergence of a public education system in order to raise the return
on their assets by increasing the supply of a complementary factor, human
capital.
This argument seems relevant to North America (and to Western Europe;
see Galor and Moav, 2006), but it would have diculties explaining the
Latin America experience. Galor et al. (2005) extends the analysis in GM by
assuming that, although human skills contribute to increase the productivity
of industrial capital, they provide no benets for landlords as such. Then,
if landlords have veto power over policies, they would block or delay the
growth of public education (see also Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) for a
complementary explanation). Certainly, this hypothesis can account for the
delay of most Latin American countries, but it still does not rationalize the
intermediate cases of the Southern Cone countries (mainly Argentina and
Uruguay) and Costa Rica, which started as early as in the second part of the
19th century to develop important schooling systems, with a polity under
the dominance of landholders.
In this paper we present a simple model of economic development which
could serve to analyze alternative patterns of economic evolution, and to
study the emergence of public education systems under dierent economic
conditions. Our main focus, however, is the appearance of public education
in land-abundant, open economies, where policies are essentially dictated by
the interests of landlords, and which need not engage in the production of
manufactured goods, since their demand for these may be wholly satised
by imports.
The analysis assumes that the skill-intensity of output and consump-
tion baskets increases with income levels, especially because the production
of some services requires the input of educated workers. More specically,
the argument is founded on three central elements: First, individual pref-
erences over consumption goods imply changes in the composition of indi-
vidual spending as income grows, embodied in Engel curves. Second, the
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production of sophisticated services (which are non-tradeable goods, in an
otherwise open economy) is intensive in human capital. Third, investment
in human capital by individual households is constrained by lack of access to
credit (see, for example, Banerjee and Newman, 1991; Galor and Zeira, 1993,
and Benabou, 1996). We also assume that the quantity and quality of labor
are not perfect substitutes. This implies that the number of high-income
agents may have strong eects on how many individuals are subsidized to
accumulate human capital. Thus, the size of the elite, as the group who
demands goods particularly intensive in human capital, may have strong
eects on the number of educated workers. This would rationalize a link
between historical conditions, especially with regard to the distribution of
land, and social choices regarding the scope and the nancing of the educa-
tion system. Education would start earlier in agricultural-based economies
when land is highly productive and its property suciently distributed as
to create a demand for a sizeable number of educated workers. The propo-
sition corresponds with the case made by Engermann and Sokolo (2000),
who indicated that the greater degree of inequality in Latin America, as
compared to North America, played an important role in explaining the dif-
ferent behaviors regarding the establishment of educational institutions (see
also Mariscal and Sokolo, 2000).
The experience of Argentina provides an illustration of the argument.
In the second half of the 19th century, Argentina became increasingly in-
tegrated into the international economy as a large producer and exporter
of agricultural goods, and an importer of manufactures. At the same time,
the composition of primary output changed signicantly, as agriculture ex-
panded over cattle rising activities, a shift that favored less extensive forms
of production (see, among others, Adelman, 1994). While the distribution
of land and incomes was still more unequal than in North America, where
wheat production was mainly based on family farms, it was less concentrated
than in other Latin American economies. The expansion of agricultural ac-
tivities allowed a very substantial growth of the urban population, especially
in the city of Buenos Aires. Apart from its administrative functions as the
capital of the country, the city developed an increasingly sophisticated, and
large, service sector. At the same time, the country experienced what is
widely considered one of the key processes in its history: the emergence of
the system of public education, associated with the emblematic gure of
Domingo Faustino Sarmiento. However, the progress of education was not
immediate, and indeed it went along with the development of the economy
and, implicitly, with a growing demand for skills (see Martnez Paz, 2003).
4
It was only in 1875 that the Province of Buenos Aires passed a comprehen-
sive law on public instruction, while the corresponding national instrument
was introduced in 1884. However, the large regional dierences in rates of
scholarization and literacy indicate that, directly or indirectly, spending on
education depended very much on the economic conguration of the locali-
ties. In 1895, in the city of Buenos Aires, almost 60% of the children of ages
6-14 attended school, doubling the national average while the rate of illiter-
acy was only 20%, against 57% in the country as a whole (and nearly 80%
in poor jurisdictions far from the central agricultural regions, like La Rioja
or Neuquen). Furthermore, the type of education provided by the Argen-
tine State seemed to correspond more to the economic incentives perceived
at the time than to the vision of the founders of the system. For exam-
ple, Sarmiento believed that the educational system had to form individuals
to work in the agricultural and industrial sectors but instead it tended to
qualify individuals for work in the services sector (see Tedesco, 1993).
From a modelling point of view, we use an overlapping generations frame-
work (similar to that in GM) to represent an open economy with a partic-
ular specication of the commodity and factor spaces: two tradeable goods
(agricultural and industrial) and one non-tradable (services), and four fac-
tors (land, physical capital, labor and skills). In this simple model, we
focus on the basic properties of comparative advantages, capital accumu-
lation of capital, and diversication of consumption as income increases,
while abstracting away issues related to technological change. The start-
ing point in our analysis is a simple agrarian economy, where the capital
stock is accumulated by landlords, while the rest of the population is in
the subsistence sector. At rst, even landlords only consume agricultural
goods, although they leave bequests. In such a setting, the rst countries
where capital accumulation in agriculture reaches the point at which a sig-
nicant demand for manufactured goods arises would be early-comers to
industrialization. Once there is a well-developed international market for
manufactured goods, labor-abundant economies may develop industrial ac-
tivities for the world market, even when their income levels are too low to
induce a widespread domestic demand for those goods. These cases (where
public education can be rationalized as a result of the interests of industrial
capitalists, as in GM) can be represented within the basic framework of our
model, as it is briey presented in the appendix. However, in this paper, our
focus is on land-rich economies where the demand for industrial goods is ini-
tially satised by imports (see Leamer, 1987), and where the accumulation
of human capital would only be triggered by the consumption of services.
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Thus, while the basic model seems capable of being adapted to analyze dif-
ferent development experiences, we concentrate on that particular pattern
and stage of economic growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section de-
scribes the setup of the model. In section 3 we analyze the evolution of an
agrarian economy and briey comment on possible alternative paths that
may be followed by economies of dierent structural congurations. Sec-
tion 4 deals with the case where large-scale educational systems appear in
land-rich economies, which have not gone through a previous stage of indus-
trialization. Conclusions are then presented in section 5.
2 Setup of the model
We consider an overlapping generations economy, where agents live for two
periods, and there is no population growth (i.e., each agent has a single
descendant). At the beginning, there are two kinds of dynasties, landowners
and workers, who dier in their factor endowments only (a set of industrial
capitalists may emerge if the economy develops a manufacturing sector).
The rst group has initially an endowment of land, which is not traded in
equilibrium, and some physical capital; for simplicity, members of this class
do not supply labor. Workers are endowed with a basic set of labor skills,
which can be increased by acquiring education.
In every period, the young agent of each dynasty receives a non-negative
(but not necessarily strictly positive) bequest from the old agent of his lin-
eage. Those bequests are potentially taxable and, in the model, such taxes
fund the spending on public education. The land owned by an individual
landlord is automatically transferred to his ospring (this transfer is not
included in the denition of bequests). Young agents use their after-tax be-
quests to accumulate assets: either physical capital for productive activities
or, in the case of workers, to acquire human capital which can be purchased
by spending on (supplementary) private education.1 Old agents carry out
work and production, they consume, and decide whether and how much to
transfer to their ospring as bequests.
In the rst period of their lives individuals who receive a nonnegative
(after-tax) bequest from the previous generation decide investments on as-
1In principle, young agents might use resources to purchase private education. However,
in the equilibrium we focus below, and under the assumptions we made, this would not
occur.
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sets, which generate income in the next period. In the second period of
their lives, all individuals allocate their income between consumption and
the bequest they leave to the following generation. Workers also participate
directly in production and receive a wage in exchange. Young agents do
not consume (or, equivalently, their consumption is included in that of their
parents).
There are three types of consumable commodities: agricultural and in-
dustrial goods, and services. Agricultural and industrial goods may be
traded internationally, while services are non-tradable. Agricultural goods
can be produced with a subsistence technology, employing unskilled labor
only, or by combining physical capital and land. Agricultural goods may be
consumed or used as physical capital. Manufacturing production uses labor,
capital and skills, and services are provided by skilled (educated) workers.
2.1 Technology and Production
Agricultural goods are denoted, A, industrial goods, I, and services, N . The
factors of production are: raw labor, L, land, T (in xed supply), physical
capital, X (which is homogeneous with the agricultural good) and human
capital, h. Markets for goods and factors are perfectly competitive, while
there are no international capital movements. Therefore, young generations
must nance physical investment and education with the bequests trans-
ferred by the previous generation. Thus, the trade balance is zero in every
period.
2.1.1 The Agricultural Sector
We assume that good A may be consumed or used as physical capital. Agri-
cultural output can be produced with two alternative technologies. The
rst, that we label \subsistence" production, is a constant returns to scale
technology with unskilled labor as its only input, generating output ew per
worker. If this technology operates in equilibrium, ew will be the prevailing
wage.2 An agent with income ew consumes agricultural goods only and does
not leave bequests, so that the group of subsistence workers does not trade
or accumulate assets.
2The individuals in this \subsistence" sector do not play an active role in the model,
but they provide a reservoir of workforce (a la Lewis) which is not exhausted in the relevant
range of variables. The reservation wage could also be interpreted without changing the
model as the income required to induce immigration.
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The second way of producing agricultural output is with a technology
that uses land and capital as inputs. We assume that the aggregate produc-
tion function of agriculture is F (T;X), where T and X are, respectively,
the total surface of land and the aggregate capital used in agriculture. Fur-
thermore, F (; ) is a constant returns function. If the number of production
units (and landlords) in the economy is m, we will suppose, for simplicity,
that the distribution of land and capital is uniform. The output of a farm
is given by:
yAt =
1
m
F (T;X) = F (
T
m
;
X
m
) = f(XAt 1)
where XAt 1 =
X
m is the capital stock of the average production unit used
in agriculture (made of goods A), which has been carried over from the
previous period. Since land is xed, we treat Tm as a constant. Capital fully
depreciates in the period. The per-capita production function f() has the
traditional properties that assure the existence of an interior solution to the
prot-maximization problem.
2.1.2 Human Capital and Skill Formation
Human capital (interpreted as skills) is produced through education. For
simplicity, the inputs of this activity are assumed to consist solely of good
A. The skills of an individual in period t+1 are a function of the resources
spent on the agent's education (e) in period t:
ht+1 = h(et)
with h0 > 0, h00 < 0.
2.1.3 The Manufacturing Sector
Industrial goods are assumed to be produced with labor, capital and human
capital:
yIt = g(L
I
t ; X
I
t 1; h
I
t )
where LI is the number of workers employed in manufacturing, hI their
average level of skills (accumulated in t-1), and XI the amount of capital
used in the sector, and carried over from the previous period. For the sake
of concreteness, we adopt the following Cobb-Douglas specication:
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yIt = zI(L
I)L(XI)X'(hI)
with L + X = 1 and '
0(hI) > 0: zI'(0) > 0 indicates the productivity
coecient when only unskilled labor is employed. If w(h) is the wage of
a worker with skills h, it can be shown that, starting from hI = 0, a rm
would not choose to employ workers with marginally higher skills when
L
w0(0)
w(0)
>
'0(0)
'(0)
That is, the manufacturing sector will not demand skilled labor when the
increase in wages as h increases from zero is steeper than the corresponding
increase in productivity. If this is the case, and manufacturing production
was to start, industrial labor would be drawn from the pool of subsistence
workers, at a xed wage ew: Then, given the elastic supply of labor, and, for
a given price pI , the value of the marginal productivity of capital at the
optimal level of benets when h = 0, would be:
rI(pI ; ew) = s[zI'(0)pI ew L ] 1X
where s is a constant that depends on the parameters . Thus, industrial
activities are not be initiated in an open economy for an aggregate capital
stock X if the marginal product of capital in agriculture exceeds the rate of
return in the manufacturing sector:
rI(pI ; ew) < f 0(X)
In the rest of the paper, it will be assumed that this condition holds for all
relevant values of X, implying that the international price pI is too low and
the productivity of capital in agriculture too high to induce industrialization
in the late-comer land-rich economy we are considering. The case of the
economies that industrialize is schematically addressed in the appendix.
2.1.4 The Service Sector
The third consumable good, N , is interpreted as an urban, relatively so-
phisticated service, the production of which requires only skilled labor.3 An
3The assumption here is that, if the economy does not develop an industrial sector,
the production of consumer services would be the only source of demand for skills. This
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individual who demands services hires skilled workers competitively, and
consumes the output they produce, which depends on the number of per-
sons who participate in the supply of the services as well as on their average
level of human capital:
yNt (nt; g(ht)) =  (nt)
Z
htg(ht)dht
where yN is the volume of services, produced by n workers with a distribu-
tion function of skills g(h); which are supplied to a given customer. Given
the wage w(h) associated with a level of skills h, the value of services con-
sumed per individual is given by pNcN = n
R
w(h)g(h)dh.
Consumers are assumed to care about the quality of the suppliers of
services (and output is assumed to grow unboundedly with h), but to a
limited extent on the number of workers who contribute to production. The
intuition behind this assumption is simply that, for a wide range of services
(from medical attention to entertainment, say), when a certain plateau of
suppliers is reached, additional workers make little dierence for the utility
of the resulting consumption, but this is enhanced with an increase in the
skills applied to production. The function  would then be strictly concave.
Although this condition is sucient to dene the qualitative features of our
argument, we make the stronger assumption that the marginal contribution
of additional workers goes to zero at a nite number en of suppliers per
customer. Thus,  is increasing in n up to a maximum en. For simplicity,
we will use the following specication:
 (n) = min[n; en]
The demand for services of an individual consumer is such that, for
low levels of spending, both the number of workers and their qualication
rise with the value of consumption up to the point where en workers are
employed. All the subsequent increases in consumption result by augmenting
the average skills of the pool of suppliers. Moreover, it can be shown that, if
the wage function, w(h) is convex, an individual demands only one type of
workers, with skills equal to the optimal average as given by the consumption
optimum. These statements are summarized in the following proposition.
is clearly a simplication, which disregards other important activities which require the
input of skilled workers, such as the public administration and education itself. However,
it may be thought that those \intermediate" demands for skills would appear when the
economy has reached a stage of sophistication and consumption diversication as to induce
a signicant \nal demand" for skills such as the one emphasized in the model.
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Proposition 1 Given a value of expenditure in services, denoted by pNcN ,
and dening the average level of wages and skills of the workers that partici-
pate in the production of those services:
R
w(h)g(h)dh = w,
R
hg(h)dh = h,
and dening the elasticity of wages with respect to skills: w(h) = w
0(h) hw(h)
 If the function w(h) is convex, then an agent demands only one quality
of labor, with skills h = h
 If there exists h such that w(h) = 1 and pN cNw(h) = n  en; then
n and h = h are, respectively, the number of workers hired by the
consumer and their level of skills.
 Otherwise, if either no h veries w(h) = 1 or, if there exists such
h, but pN cNw(h)  en, then the optimal amount of labor is en while the
average h veries that pN cNen = w(h).
Proof: The maximal production of services for a given cost solves:
max  (n)
Z
hg(h)dh ()
s:t: pNcN = n
Z
w(h)g(h)dh
and
Z
g(h)dh = 1
The dual problem is,
min n
Z
w(h)g(h)dh ()
s:t: y =  (n)
Z
hg(h)dh
and
Z
g(h)dh = 1
Since w() is convex, R w(h)g(h)dh > w(R hg(h)dh) for every skill
distribution g(h). Cost minimization implies that the optimal demand is
concentrated at skills h, so that g(h) is non-zero only at h. Problem () then
reduces to:
max (n)h; s:t: pNcN = nw(h) and h =
Z
hg(h)dh
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The variables of choice are n and h. The rst order conditions are:
n :  0(n)h  w(h)
h :  (n) = nw0(h)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier of the cost constraint. Then we have that:
 (n) =
 0(n)
 (n)
n  w(h)
w0(h)
1
h
=
1
w(h)
(1)
with equality for an interior solution.
Recall that  (n) is either 1 (for n  en) or 0 (for n > en). Then, accord-
ing to condition (1) the optimal n must verify that at an interior solution
 (n) = 1 while h must be such that w(h) is also equal to 1. On the other
hand, the expenditure on services (pNcN ) is given. Therefore, the amount
h such that w(h) = 1 must verify that pN cNw(h) = n
  en. If so, the optimal
amounts of labor and average human capital are n = n and h = h. Oth-
erwise, condition (1) veries with strict inequality, and the optimal n is not
interior, i.e.  (n) = 0, implying that n > en. Then, the choice problem of
the agent is just to maximize enh, subject to pNcN = nw(h). The solution
to this problem obtains at n = en while h is takes simply the value h such
that pN cNen = w(h): 2
2.2 The Agents
Individuals, within as well as across generations, are identical in their pref-
erences and innate abilities.
2.2.1 Preferences
Preferences are dened over consumption-bequest bundles, c =
hcA; cI ; cN ; boi, c 2 R4+, where cj is the quantity consumed of good j, while bo
is the bequest (measured in terms of agricultural goods) left to ospring (we
reserve the notation b for the bequest received by the agent when young).
These preferences capture the intuition that consumers prefer a diver-
sied bundle, but there are certain consumption thresholds to be reached
before adding an additional degree of diversity. We partition the consump-
tion space into four subsets (which may be thought of as \stages"), according
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to which thresholds have been exceeded (or equivalently, what degree of con-
sumption diversication has been reached). Within each stage, preferences
are described by a (stage-specic) Stone-Geary function. Preferences and
the associated demand curves have implicit an ordering of the goods which
are part of the consumption basket at dierent levels of income. There are
four stages: i) consumption of agricultural goods (A), only; ii) consumption
of A and positive bequests; iii) consumption of A and industrial (I) goods as
well as positive bequests; iv) consumption of goods A, I and services (N),
and positive bequests.
Specically, preferences are represented by the following expression:
u (c) =
8>>><>>>:
cA if cA  ecA1
(cA   ecA1)1 (bo) + k1 if c 2 C2
(cA   ecA2)A3cI3I (1 ) (bo  ebo2) + k2 if c 2 C3
(cA   ecA3)A4(cI   ecI3)I4cN4N (1 ) (bo  ebo3) + k3 if c 2 C4
Ci = fc 2 R4+ : ecJ;i 1 < cJ  ecJ;i for every cJ = cA; cI ; cN ; bo; i = 2; 3; 4g
A3 + I3 = 1 ;A4 + I4 + N4 = 1
k1 = u(ecA1; 0; 0; 0); k2 = u(ecA2; 0; 0;ebo2); k3 = u(ecA3;ecI3; 0;ebo3)
In words, each Ci represents a range of values of consumption, determined
by the income and limited to some kinds of goods. By denition each of them
is, geometrically, a \box" in R4+, with its frontier dened by the thresholds
of consumption ec. These boxes are ordered: Cj lies to the upper-right side
of a box Ci if and only if i < j. Under this characterization the preferences
are still well behaved.
Proposition 2 u represents a rational preference ordering.
Proof: We have to show that the preference ordering () dened by u(c)
over C is complete, transitive and monotonic.
Completeness follows immediately. If two bundles c and c belong to C
two cases are possible:
 c 2 Ci and c 2 Cj , with i 6= j. Then, by denition, if i > j, c  c, while
if j > i, c  c.
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 c; c 2 Ci. Then, either u(c)  u(c) and therefore c  c or u(c)  u(c),
i.e. c  c.
Similarly for transitivity: consider c, c, c 2 C, where c  c and c  c.
Four cases are possible:
 c, c, c 2 Ci. Then, by denition u(c)  u(c), while u(c)  u(c).
Therefore u(c)  u(c), i.e. c  c.
 c, c 2 Ci and c 2 Cj, i 6= j. By denition, since c  c, i < j. Therefore
c  c.
 c 2 Ci and c, c 2 Cj, i 6= j. Since c  c, i < j. Therefore, c  c.
 c 2 Ci, c 2 Cj and c 2 Ck, i 6= j, j 6= k, i 6= k. Then, since c  c,
i < j, and since c  c, j < k. Therefore, i < k and c  c.
Finally, to show monotonicity, just consider c  c. Again, we can ana-
lyze this by cases:
 If c 2 Ci and c 2 Cj, with i 6= j, by the denition of C1; : : : ; C4, given
1  k < l  4, for every ck 2 Ck there exists cl 2 Cl such that ck  cl,
while for every cl 2 Cl there is no ck 2 Ck such that cl  ck. Therefore,
if c  c then i < j, i.e. c  c.
 If c; c 2 Ci then, since each u is monotonic, u(c)  u(c). This implies
that c  c. 2
In all cases, whenever an income threshold is crossed (when an individ-
ual can purchase the minimum consumption quantities of a certain stage),
the agent prefers the most diversied consumption bundle attainable (that
is, consumption corresponds to the highest feasible stage). Regarding the
incentive for leaving a bequest, individual welfare varies directly with the
amount of resources left to an ospring, independently of the use of that
bequest by the next generation. This implies, in particular, that savings de-
pend only on the income of the adult agent, and not on the expected return
on assets.4
4This form of bequest motive (i.e., the \joy of giving") is common in the recent lit-
erature on income distribution and growth. The assumption that the rate of return is
irrelevant in the decision to leave bequests does not greatly aect the qualitative results
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Although this particular formulation of preferences has features that are
not altogether appealing (like potential jumps in quantities demanded in the
transition from one stage to another, see below), it captures a dierentiation
between \basic needs" and \luxury goods", and generates a \consumption
ladder" where new goods get included into the basket as income grows.
2.2.2 Demand
Demand curves arise from maximizing welfare subject to a budget con-
straint, which in its most general form is given by:
cA + pIcI + pNcN + b
o  i
where i is total income of the old agent. With the particular functional
form we have adopted for preferences, optimization will yield threshold in-
come levels, determining the transition from one diversication stage to the
following. From standard methods we obtain:
Lemma 1 The consumption-bequest baskets of an agent are as follows:
 In C1: cA  ecA1 = ei1: cA = i.
 In C2:
cA = (1  )(i ei1) + ecA1
and
bo = (i ei1)
 In C3:
bo = (i ei2) +ebo2
emphasized in the paper. However, it may have strong implications in some contexts. In
particular, this type of savings function allows the existence of states where the marginal
net product of capital is negative. Also, initial dierences in endowments may have no
eect on steady state consumption, while that would not happen, say, with standard Euler
equations if all agents face the same interest rate, since the ratio of marginal utilities of
any two agents would be preserved over time.
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cA = ecA2 + (1  )A3(i ei2)
pIcI = (1  )I3(i ei2):
where ei2 = ecA2 +ebo2.
 In C4:
bo = (i ei3(pI)) +ebo3
cA = (1  )A4(i ei3(pI)) + ecA3
pIcI = (1  )I4(i ei3(pI)) + pIecI3
nw(h) = (1  )N4(i ei3(pI))
where ei3 = ecA3 + pIecI3 +ebo3.
Proof: Immediate, from the maximization of u(c) subject to the budget con-
straint. 2
Notice that while there is no jump in agricultural consumption when
making the transition from the rst to the second stage, there may be jumps
in either consumption or bequests when making any of the subsequent tran-
sitions. To x this idea, consider the case of the transition into industrial
consumption. As soon as i  ei2, it must be the case that cA  ecA2 and
bo  ebo2. However, it could be that, for instance, lim
i%~{2
cA > ecA2 and lim
i%~{2
bo ebo2. This would imply that after crossing the threshold, consumption of
agricultural goods has a discrete drop, and bequests go up. The opposite
situation, where consumption increases and bequests (hence, capital accu-
mulation) fall after the transition, is also feasible. Since this last case would
imply that the economy may get trapped in an oscillation around transitions,
we will impose conditions such that this possibility is avoided.
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Once having eliminated the possibility of having oscillations at the tran-
sition thresholds, the structure of demands can be used to distinguish be-
tween two economies with the same amounts of land and aggregate capital
but exhibiting dierent income distributions. More precisely, calling these
economies 1(T;X) and 2(T;X), where T and X are the given amounts of
land and capital, if the number of landlords in them are, respectively, m1
and m2, with m1 < m2 we have:
Lemma 2 If the consumptions in 1(T;X) and 2(T;X) are c1 and c2,
with c1 2 Ci and c2 2 Cj, then i  j.
Proof: A representative landlord in 1 has, according to our characterization
of the agricultural sector, an income
i1 = f(X
A
t 1) =
1
m1
F (T;X)
while an average landlord in 2 earns
i2 = f(X
A
t 1) =
1
m2
F (T;X):
Since m1 < m2, i1 > i2. Then, by the denition of demands, c1 > c2.
Then, if c1 2 Ci and c2 2 Cj, either i = j or i > j. It can also be noticed
that, since bequests increase with income, economy 1 will reach a given level
of the capital stock at an earlier date than the economy where property is
more subdivided. 2
This means that the landlords in the economy with a more concentrated
income distribution will reach earlier a more diversied consumption.
3 Growth and structural evolution
3.1 An agricultural economy
We start by analyzing an economy where only good A is produced and con-
sumed. Here, unskilled individuals work in the subsistence sector, consumingew; and have no other choices available. Landlords invest in physical capital
all the bequest they receive, and choose their consumption/bequest bundle
in the second period. By assumption, in this stage, only the agricultural
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good is produced and consumed. Then, if the initial capital stock (received
by the rst generation) is X0, the demand functions discussed before induce
the following dynamics:
Proposition 3 Let ei1 = ecA1, ei2 = ecA2+ebo2, assume that f(0) < ei1 and that
there is at least a value of X such that X = (f(X) ei1). Then:
 there are two xed points for (f(X) ei1), bX l1 and bXh1 (low and high,
respectively),
 the economy reaches a steady state in C2 (where landlords leave pos-
itive bequests and consume only agricultural goods) if and only ifei2 > f(X0)  f( bX l1) > ei1 and f( bXh1 ) < ei2.
Proof: By assumption, f(0)   ei1 < 0 and there exists X such that X =
(f(X) ei1). Then, since (f(X) ei1) is strictly concave, it has two xed
points, bX l1 and bXh1 , with bX l1  bXh1 . The xed points are steady states of the
dynamics of the capital stock (and, equivalently, bequests). bX l1 is unstable,
while bXh1 is stable under the dynamics dened by bo2 on C2.
If X0 is such that ei2 > f(X0) > f( bX l1) > ei1 and f( bXh1 ) < ei2, there is
capital accumulation, and the economy is not trapped in a subsistence equi-
librium where bequests are zero. Furthermore, capital accumulation stops atbXh1 while the economy is still in C2. Conversely, if the economy reaches a
steady state in C2, it must be at either one of the xed points, be it because
X0 = bX l1 or because the dynamics leads to the stable value bXh1 : 2
3.2 The transition to industrial consumption
If capital accumulation proceeds, landlords would start consuming manu-
factured goods. Some properties for this stage can be summarized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 4 If f( bXh1 ) > ei2 = f( eX2) and pI < 1sX zI'(0) ewL(f 0(X))X
 the economy enters stage 3 (with consumption of goods and bequests
of landlords in C3),
 the manufactured goods consumed by landlords are supplied from im-
ports, and there is no domestic production of industrial goods.
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Proof: If the capital required for entering stage 3, eX2; is less than bXh1 ; the
economy does not get trapped in stage 2. The expression on pI just restates
the condition for no production of good I discussed in section 2.1.3. 2
This result indicates the conditions for the economy to enter C3; with
consumption of industrial goods, obtained through imports. However, there
may be the possibility that in the transition to that stage, consumption
rises as much as to lower the bequests (and therefore the capital for the
next period) to levels below the transition point, forcing the economy to
return to stage 2. A condition to avoid that trap is summarized in the
following:5
Theorem 1 A sucient condition for not returning to stage 2 is that
(ei2   ei1) < ebo2.
Proof: The economy enters stage 3 once the capital stock exceeds eX2, with
f( bXh1 ) > f( eX2) > f( bX l1). But in order to ensure that it does not return to
C2, the unstable steady state at C3, bX l2, must be such that f( bX l2)  f( eX2).
The functions that characterize the dynamics of bequests at C2 and
C3are:
C2 : bo = (i ei1) = i  ei1
C3 : bo = (i ei2) +ebo2 = i  (ei2  ebo2)
Since the only variable is i, the latter is a parallel displacement of the
former. Then, if we take the dierence between them, say bo in C3 less bo
in C2, suppose that
 (ei2  ebo2) + ei1 > 0 (II)
If the sign of this expression is positive, there is an upwards displacement
of bequests in going from C2 to C3. If so, the xed points at C2, bX l1  bXh1 ,
and those at C3, bX l2  bXh2 , will be such that bX l2  bX l1 and bXh1  bXh2 .
In fact (II) is equivalent to (ei2   ecA1) < ebo2, in which case we have
that:
5A background condition that we assume from now on is that there exists, at each Ci
(i = 2; 3; 4), at least one xed point in the dynamics of bequests.
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f( bX l2)  f( bX l1)  f( eX2)
which ensures that capital will not decrease down from eX2: 2
We are interested in modeling a \late comer" economy, where consump-
tion of industrial goods grows signicant after other countries have already
developed a manufacturing sector and participate in international trade of
goods. This means that industrial goods are available for trade. The in-
ternational price of good I is assumed to be suciently low (relative to
domestic factor prices) to discourage production. This assumption held also
in the previous stage (of pure agricultural consumption), and will continue
to hold if the economy enters into the next stage, where landlords consume
services. We explore in the appendix the alternative scenarios of \early
industrialization", where the economy produces the industrial goods con-
sumed locally, or manufacturing activities get started \for export" before
there is a domestic demand for those goods.
4 The rise of public education
4.1 Demand for services in a late-comer economy
As seen in the previous section, some economies may never go through a
phase of industrial production, even if their income is such that they in-
clude manufactured goods in their consumption bundle. Then the economy
may reach a stage with a signicant demand for \sophisticated" services
before undergoing industrialization. The following proposition describes the
dynamics in this stage.
Proposition 5 Let ei3 = f( eX3) = ecA3 + pIecI3 + ebo3. If bXh2 > eX3 > bX l2,
the economy enters into stage 4, where bXh2 and bX l2 are, respectively, the
high and low steady states when the dynamics of bequests is determined by
dynamics on C3.
A sucient condition for avoiding a downward-jump in bequests once in
C4 is that (ei3   ei2) < (ebo3  ebo2).
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Proof: Immediate. bXh2 > eX3 > bX l2 simply establishes that accumulation in
C3 has reached the point where the consumption basket diversies to include
services (the condition depends on the price pI) before attaining the stable
steady state at that stage. To obtain the sucient condition for continued
accumulation it is enough to recast the proof of Theorem 1 for C4. 2
The evolution of the consumption and production structure need not
end there. The possibility that an economy develops an industrial sector
after services, for example, may be of special interest. However, we shall
not pursue that analysis here, and concentrate on the question of how the
supply of educated workers to produce services is generated.
4.2 The Emergence of Human Capital
The demand for services would induce a demand for skills. We assume that
the skills required for the provision of services require some kind of formal
education, which must be acquired when young. Thus, at any given time the
number of (adult) skilled workers is xed: subsistence workers cannot mi-
grate into the service sector. This implies that dierent wages can prevail in
both sectors, since there is no arbitrage opportunity, and therefore that there
are potential gains for a young unskilled worker considering whether to ac-
quire human capital. But young subsistence workers are credit-constrained,
and individual landlords do not have incentives to nance the education
of young workers who, by assumption, can freely choose their employment
and cannot commit to the repayment of potential \education loans". As a
consequence, some kind of collective action mechanism might improve the
welfare of the elite. As in GM, but through a dierent channel, young land-
lords who anticipate their future demand for services might accept to nance
the education system by way of a tax on the bequests they receive.
4.2.1 Public education
Adult agents with an income above a certain threshold will demand ser-
vices. These will be provided by skilled workers. Here, the education of
those skilled workers is assumed to be provided by public school system
nanced by taxes on the bequests received by young landlords. The char-
acteristics of this public system are decided upon by a central authority
who internalizes the optimal behavior of the group of young landlords, and
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can perfectly enforce tax collection (for simplicity, a balanced budget is as-
sumed). Education is supposed to be convenient for the worker (that is: the
wage of skilled labor is higher than ew). We assume that the authority can
limit the size of the set of individuals who receive education (in practice,
this may be done by varying the geographical coverage of the education sys-
tem, or by determining conditions of schooling such that some groups have
preferential access). The planner internalizes the quantity-quality choice of
individual consumers (which would be established in the manner discussed
above). Here we will assume, for simplicity, that the solution of the policy
problem will be such that number of workers per landlord has reached the
saturation point en, so that the number of individuals that receive education
is determined by that condition, and the margin of decision of the authority
is on the level of skills to be supplied.
Then, taking into consideration the consumption behavior of the set of
landlords (denoted group A), the authority will establish taxes on bequests
(which, in this framework, operate as lump-sum transfers from landlords
to the government), and choose a distribution of human capital (g(h)) that
young workers to be educated receive. This distribution (which, in the
optimum will be concentrated on a single point) results in an average level
of skills h. As stated above, skills are produced with (agricultural) inputs
according to the function h = h (e).
The results of the optimization of the policy-maker are summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 6 The education system will provide a single level of educa-
tion e to all the group of individuals who receive training. If for some e,
the function h() has an elasticity h(e) = 1 then the optimal amount of
workers that receive education is n  en and the level of education will be
e. Otherwise, if h(e) < 1, en workers will be educated and e will verify the
following condition between the marginal utilities of income (derived from
holdings of land and physical capital) and education for service suppliers:
(1  (1  )N4)enf 0(b  ene)
iA  ei3 = (1  )N4
h0(e)
h(e)
Proof: Let n be the number of workers who receive education per landlord,
and l(e) the proportion of those agents who receive an education correspond-
ing to spending e;
R
l(e)de = 1. Total spending in education is n
R
el(e)de,
and the income of the average landlord, when old, is: iA = f(b n R el(e)de),
given that the bequests received when young have been taxed in the amount
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necessary in order to nance education expenditures. Given the demand
functions in the stage C4, the utility of the landlord can be written as (ig-
noring constants):
uA = (1  (1  )N4) ln(iA  ei3) + (1  )N4 lnn Z h(e)l(e)de
Remembering that iA = f(b  n R el(e)de), maximization with respect to
l(ek) subject to the constraint
R
l(e)de = 1 results in the following, if in the
optimum l(ek) > 0:
 (1  ) f
0
iA  ei3nek +  h(e
k)
h
   = 0
where  = (1  )N4,  is the multiplier of the constraint, and the average
level of skills is: h =
R
h(e)l(e)de .
Considering the condition for a level of education ek +e:
(1  ) f
0
iA  ei3n(ek +e  ek) = (h(ek +e)  h(ek)) 1h
i.e. h(e
k)
e is constant for every e
k with non-zero demand. Therefore, h0
must be the same at every optimal level. That is, there exists just one value
e at which this is true, since h is strictly concave.
Then, l(e) is a degenerate distribution that yields a single value h(e),
which, according to the preferences of the A agents has to be h.
The expression of uA can be rewritten as:
uA = (1  ) ln(iA  ei3) +  lnnh(e)
Maximizing the utility with respect to the single value e results in:
(1  )n f
0
iA  ei3 = 
h0(e)
h(e)
while the rst order condition for n is:
(1  ) f
0
iA  ei3 e  n
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with strict equality if the interior solution is such that n  en. In that case,
the ratio between the two rst-order would be e such that h
0(e)
h(e) e = 1. With
e = e, if the optimal value of n for  = n was larger than en, then the
solution would correspond to the level of e that satises the corresponding
FOC with n = en; this value would be such that h(e) < 1 and e > e: 2
This proposition establishes that, if e is the level of education such that
the elasticity of skills with respect of education is one, as long as the optimal
spending in education is E  ene, education per worker will be xed at e;
and the expansion of education will be \extensive", through the increase in
n. After that threshold is reached, n = en, and the additional spending will
result in proportional increases in e.
In what follows we will assume for simplicity that education has already
saturated the level of workers, although the model seems capable of ratio-
nalizing the existence of a stage where a growing number of workers receives
basic education, followed by another where the size of the educated set stops
increasing and the average level of skills rises. Also, if the elite is subdivided,
in the sense that the education system is destined to satisfy the demands of
groups with dierent incomes and demands for services, there can be a dis-
tribution of people who receive dierent levels of education; the size of the
members of each level would be a function of the size of the set of landlords
that demands services requiring those skills. In any case, if all landlords
require the services of en workers, the size of the group of educated workers
would be proportionate to the size of that elite.
It may be noticed that the solution implied by the optimization of the
welfare of the landlords has a pro-education bias (given that n = en) com-
pared to the case where the planner takes into account the interests of the
educated workers: when increasing the supply of skills, all the additional
services to be produced will be consumed by landlords, while an increase
in the output of agricultural goods will be shared between landlords and
service workers, because the latter will benet from a rise in the value of
spending on services.
In the transition where members of group A start to demand services,
the number of workers who receive education is bounded at en per landlord.
While we assume this for any economy, the distribution of land ownership
aects the aggregate number of educated workers. To see this consider,
again as in section 2:2:2, two economies (1 and 2)with the same amounts
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of land but dierent number of landlords , m1 and m2, respectively, with
m1 < m2. Then we have:
Corollary 1 In economy 2, the start of education would occur later than
in 1, but the number educated individuals who receive education would be
larger.
Proof: The rst part is a immediate consequence of Lemma 2: since in 1
services will be consumed earlier, the educational system has to be created be-
fore than in 2. On the other hand, according to Proposition 6, once reached
the critical number of educated agents, en per landlord, and maintaining the
assumption that only landlords consume services, the number of educated
agents will be m1en < m2en, i.e., the number of educated individuals will be
larger in 2. 2
The emergence of taxation to nance education modies the dynamics of
bequests, since these are determined by income, which is reduced by taxation
through its eects on capital. However, it can be shown that the condition
for accumulation to proceed in the stage with consumption of services is the
same as the condition found before, when taxation was not considered.
Proposition 7 The same conditions on eX3 established before for accumu-
lation to proceed after the transition to stage 4 hold also with an optimal
level of taxation on bequests, except if eX3 = eb3 = bX l3 with e > 0.
Proof: For the proposition to hold, we have to consider a new transition
value eX 03 = b   ne. If f( bXh2 ) > f( eX 03) and f( bX l3)  f( eX 03)  f( bXh3 ), the
accumulation process will continue. To see that this can in fact be so, recall
that these conditions are veried by eX3. So, if eX 03 is close enough to eX3
we are done. In fact, expenditures on education will start from values near
zero, since when f( eX 03) is very close to ei3, h0(e)h(e) grows unboundedly large.
That means that e is very close to 0. So, the only possible problem arises ifeX3 = bX l3 > eX 03. 2
4.2.2 The price of human capital
We are interested in analyzing the conditions that link the price of human
capital to other parameters in the model. A rst, and intuitive, result is that
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holding international prices constant, all the relevant quantities depend on
the level of capital accumulation in the economy, as summarized in the level
of bequests, b. Since the capital stock increases with b, and the value of
spending in services is proportional to the income of landlords in excess of
the threshold (i ei3), if the number of service workers remains constant aten per landlord, the wages of those individuals grows directly with b. Such
wages result from the level of skills of the workers and the unit \price of
skills". The evolution of that price (or, in other words, the rate of return on
education) is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 The wage per unit of skills is given by:
wh =
w(h(e))
h(e)
= 
f(b  ene) ei3enh(e)
where, as before:  = (1  )N4
Let z = f(b ene) ei;and let bf(x) = f 0(x)f(x) denote the logarithmic derivative
of the function f: Education and the capital stock vary as a function of b
according to:
@e
@b
=
bz0   bzen(bz0   bz) + (bh0   bh) > 0
where bz = f 0(X)
f(X) ei3 , bz0 = f 00(X)f 0(X) , bh = h0(e)h(e) and bh0 = h00 (e)h0(e)
and:
@X
@b
= 1  en@e
@b
=
(bh0   bh)en(bz0   bz) + (bh0   bh) > 0
Then, the sign of the change in the unit wage is governed by:
sgn(
@wh
@b
) = sgn(
1
wh
@wh
@b
) = sgn((1  )f
00
f 0
  
h00
h0
)
Proof: The characterization of wh just recasts the demand function of ser-
vices enw(h)h = (iA  ei3)
or
w(h) =
en zh
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On the other hand, @e@b obtains by dierentiating w.r.t. b the semi-
elasticity condition of arbitrage between investments:
(1  ) f
0(b  ene)
f(b  ene) ei3 = (1  )bz = bh = 
h0(e)
h(e)
The characterization of @X@b follows from the specication of
@e
@b .
The condition on the sign of @wh@b is obtained by dierentiating w.r.t. b
the characterization of wh:2
Thus, the evolution of the returns on skills depends on the technological
features of the agriculture and education sectors. For example, if the pro-
ductivity of education falls less quickly than the productivity of investment
in sector A then, for a given rise in bequest, investment would be increas-
ingly directed towards education, and at some point the wage per unit skills
would decline.6
4.3 Moving Ahead: Brief Comments on Subsequent Phases
Certainly, the creation of a large public school system might aect the way
in which a late-comer land-rich economy would evolve. Here, we briey men-
tion some alternative paths that may be followed, and which seem capable
of being analyzed using the basic framework of this paper.
Possible Emergence of Manufacturing At some point, the eect of
decreasing returns in the primary goods sector and the expansion of the
supply of skills could result in the emergence of a manufacturing sector.
This may also occur if, for some reason, the international price of indus-
trial goods increases relative to those of agricultural commodities. That
is, industrialization may take place through a price shock or, possibly, as a
consequence of the accumulation of factors.
In any case, capital would ow to manufacturing. This may change the
political economy in several ways. One issue would be whether landlords
6As a consequence of the assumption that the production of skills depends only on the
input of goods, the result ignores a potentially important eect: education itself can be a
(maybe large) source of demand for skills. In the context of the model, this may introduce
a wedge between the interests of young landlords (who want education to increase the
future supply of services) and the older generation, who would have their consumption
opportunities reduced as skilled labor is drawn from the direct production of services to
the education sector.
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transform themselves into entrepreneurs with interests in both tradable sec-
tors, or whether they are lenders of resources to a new group of industrial
entrepreneurs (the division of the elite has been an often emphasized feature
of resource-based economies with an incipient industrialization). Also, it is
likely that the group of educated workers gains political inuence. With
the emergence of manufacturing, these agents would have mixed interests
as suppliers of services, as workers in the manufacturing sector and, if their
income is sucient, as consumers of industrial goods. In addition, the in-
ow of workers from the subsistence sector to the (mainly urban) industrial
sector may also create a new signicant group of inuence, with interests in
raising the demand for industrial labor. That conguration is likely to raise
issues related to industrial protection and the public spending in education.
Diversied Consumption of Skilled Workers If skilled workers get
rich enough in the process of economic growth, they would start to diversify
their consumption-bequest basket. If educated workers leave bequests to
their ospring, the accumulation of resources would take a dierent form.
The specication of the investment options of those workers may vary: if
there is an active capital market, they could act as lenders of funds to owners
of physical capital, as well as potential purchasers of private education. From
the point of view of the landlords, the emergence of a privately nanced
education sector would represent a positive development, since that would
lower the price of skills without taxation on the elite. This development
may lead to a crowding out eect on public education.
The appearance of a demand for industrial goods by skilled workers does
not vary noticeably the pattern of evolution in the land-rich economy: this
will become more open as demand shifts from locally produced agricultural
goods to imported manufactures, without much change elsewhere. The case
would be dierent if the wage of skilled workers rises to the point where
they also demand services. There would then be a \secondary" demand for
skills (and for new skilled workers), on the part of the agents who previously
were selling services to landlords/capitalists. Also, the incentives of policy-
makers would change, since an A planner would recognize that there are no
exclusive goods any more, consumed only by landlords. An increment in the
supply of skills would benet the educated workers as consumers. However,
the A planner would likewise internalize the fact that a lower supply of skills
increases the wage of educated workers, and raises their demand for services,
which would crowd out the demand by landlords. The two eects would be
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weighted when considering taxation and spending in education.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a model that can rationalize dierent patterns in the
emergence of educational systems, in a way that can be pertinent in ac-
counting for contrasts between the experiences of countries in the American
continent in the 19th century. As a representation of economic develop-
ment, the range of validity of the model is still limited by the fact that we
have disregarded phenomena like capital movements and, especially, tech-
nical change, which should be central elements in a more general analysis.
However, as it is, the model seems useful to highlight dierent motives for
the elite to nance the education of low-income workers, and to point out
possible alternative paths of economic evolution.
The model focuses on the demand for human-capital-intensive services of
high-income groups. This channel can generate a demand for education, and
appears because we adopt a setup with multiple goods, where consumption
preferences are non-homothetic and the demand for skill-intensive commodi-
ties emerges at comparatively high levels of income. We also assumed that
the quantity and quality of labor are not perfect substitutes; consequently,
the number of high-income agents may have strong eects on how many
individuals are subsidized to accumulate human capital.
Several classes of economies, with dierent qualitative behaviors, were
identied. The rst kind is that of early comers to industrialization. These
are economies where, in the process of capital accumulation, agricultural
productivity is high enough to generate a widespread demand for manu-
factured goods, which must be produced internally. The growth of the
agricultural-industrial economy (with a bias towards industry, due to the
higher income elasticity of the demand for the corresponding goods) may
lead to the emergence of a demand for skills.
A second class of economies are those which are well endowed with labor,
and where agricultural productivity is not enough to trigger industrialization
for the domestic market, but can engage in labor intensive manufacturing
for exports if and when an international market for those goods develop. In
this basic setup, we merely refer to the rst steps of industrialization for
these economies. Further work should certainly consider with more detail
the processes of technical change and the incentives to supply and demand
for human capital in production. Preliminary results suggest that in order
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for education to emerge as a result of a capitalist-led political choice, the
wages of unskilled workers should be suciently high (see the Appendix).
Our focus was on land-rich economies where income growth is such that a
large demand for industrial goods appears at a time when the supply by early
comers is already well developed. Straightforward comparative advantage
implies that those economies will import manufactures. If the demand for
sophisticated services starts for incomes above a certain threshold, increases
in the value of the output of primary goods can imply that, at some point, a
demand for skilled labor may appear in order to satisfy that consumption by
high-income groups. These groups, then, would not oppose the emergence of
public education to increase the skills of a set of workers, the number of which
would depend on the number of landlords who demand services. Hence, the
diusion of education would depend on the size of the elite and, indirectly,
on the degree of concentration of land ownership. The growth of an educated
class can change the political balance, and the incentives to provide public
education, by incorporating into the picture a new inuential group, and
also by giving rise to a population who in some cases may self-nance the
acquisition of skills of descendants. A large manufacturing activity may
or may not arise spontaneously. Over time, a new political economy of
industrial protection is likely to result from the interplay of the interests of
landlord, capitalists, skilled workers (at rst, mainly occupied in services).
Quite dierent paths seem possible according to how the implicit conicts
are processed.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Early industrialization: a preliminary sketch of an argu-
ment
Consider an economy that accumulates agricultural capital before there is a
signicant international supply of industrial goods. If capital accumulation
proceeds to the point where landlords start demanding industrial goods,
they must be produced locally since the economy is closed for all practical
matters. Then, it is clear that production would diversify into manufactur-
ing as a result of the new composition of consumption demands. Thus, if
and when the income of landlords reaches the threshold where their con-
sumption diversies, there would be a shift of capital into manufacturing,
and the dynamics would change compared with the agricultural stage. Now,
the logic of capital-skills complementarity would apply. With certain tech-
nologies, manufacturing skills may be acquired through on-the-job training
(apprenticeship). At some point, the provision of public education may be
in the interest of capitalists, as in GM.
Once the early-comers to industrialization have engaged in that path,
the economies that lag behind in capital accumulation need not follow the
same sequence: when there is an active international market where man-
ufactures trade for primary goods, the late-comers may industrialize \pre-
maturely", or alternatively, become producers of services for high-income
groups without rst developing manufactures. Regarding the rst possibil-
ity, standard international trade arguments indicate that an economy with
suitable factor endowments can produce industrial goods for the world mar-
ket, independently of domestic consumption. This would be more likely if
landlords are suciently frugal and entrepreneurial while agriculture is not-
too-productive (which speeds up the arrival of the moment where investment
in manufacturing becomes protable at the margin relative to accumulating
agricultural capital) and there is a large supply of labor capable of moving
from a subsistence sector to manufactures (a la Lewis). Also here the pro-
vision of education would be likely to be predicated on a perceived demand
for more skilled industrial workers.
7.2 Export-led industrialization
This case would represent an economy which, with suitable factor endow-
ments, produces good I for the world market, even without a widespread
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consumption of that good. Given the specication of the production func-
tion and the assumption that uneducated labor is supplied elastically at
wage ew, and assuming that capital is perfectly mobile between sectors:
Proposition 9 Capital X is allocated to sector I, when workers have no
skills acquired through education, if:
f 0(X)  rI(pI ; ew; h0)
where rI = ew XL LX is the return on capital in manufacturing and the (sub-
sistence) wage is ew, while labor has the basic (zero-education) level of skills.
At eXI , the minimal level of capital accumulation that veries this condition,
the economy will enter into the manufacturing stage. A sucient condition
that ensures that the economy will not return to agricultural stage, once it
entered into the manufacturing stage is that (ei2   ecA1) < ebo2.
Proof: Given that eXI , the minimal value that veries the condition is lower
than the stable steady state in the agricultural stage, bXh1 , capital will also be
invested in manufacturing. The sucient condition to avoid the return to
the agricultural stage is the same as for the economy without production of
manufactures, as described by Theorem 1. 2
The condition above will be more easily satised with low subsistence
wages, not-too-productive agriculture and frugal capitalists. High produc-
tivity and/or high prices of good I do as well induce production.
If the workers do not save or educate and only agricultural goods are
consumed, the system can be described by:
iK = f(XA) + (X  XA)r
f 0(XA) = r = rI(pI ; ew; h0)
bo = (iK  ei1) = X = XA +XI
The rst equation denes the income of the capitalists (agents K, who
are at the same time the landlords) as the output of the agricultural sector
plus the return on capital invested in manufacturing. The second equation
species the equilibrium allocation of the capital inherited from the previ-
ous generation and the rate of return. The third equation establishes the
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bequest, and species that it must be used to install future capital in both
sectors.
In order to consider the incentives to start an educational system in such
an economy, consider now the existence of a social planner representing the
capitalist-landlord agents (K). This authority may tax agents K (the agents
who leave bequests) in order to nance public education, as a representative
of that group. The incentive would be to educate individuals will work
in industry I. In principle, it may be the case that the industry hires
educated and uneducated workers. Let  be the fraction of the labor force
(L) that is skilled, and let h(e) be their average level of human capital,
which corresponds to a per-individual expenditure in education denoted by
e. Then, total spending in education would be:
E = Le
The allocation of resources would be driven by the maximization of the
total returns to agents K derived from agriculture and industrial activities.
Then, it may be shown that:
Proposition 10 Spending in education will not start as long as:
f 0(b XI) = rI(pI ; ew; 0) > 1
L
'0(0)
'(0)
h0(0) ew
and this condition can be expressed as:
(
pIew )1=X > v '0(0)('(0))1+ 1X h0(0)
Proof: Skilled workers must earn at least ew. Otherwise they will not accept
employment in manufacturing. Consider now a K planner contemplating
an investment in education, starting from a situation where all industrial
workers are unskilled. The problem of the planner can be stated as:
max
XI ;;L;e
f(b XI   Le) + pI'(h(e))LLXXI   ewL
The expression indicates the aggregate (future) income of a (now) young
capitalist, given that the level of bequests is b, a fraction  has received skills
h, so that the average level of skills is h, and all workers L receive a wage
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ew. Clearly, all choice variables must be non negative. A solution would
satisfy rst order conditions given by:
XI :  f 0 + X pIy
I
XI
 0 (i)
 :  f 0Le + '
0
'
h(e)pIy
I  0 (ii)
L :  f 0e + L pIy
I
L
  ew  0 (iii)
e :  f 0L + '
0
'
h0(e)pIyI  0 (iv)
For  = 0 we obtain from (iii) that ew = L pIyIL (at an interior solution
for L).
On the other hand, (ii) is equivalent to:
 f 0 + '
0(e)
'(e)
h(e)
e
pIy
I
L
 0
and replacing by the expression for ew we have:
 f 0 + '
0(e)
'(e)
h(e)
e
ew
L
 0
Taking the limit of this expression for e! 0, for  = 0 we have that:
ew
L
'0(0)
'(0)
lim
e!0
h(e)
e
 f 0
which recalling the L'Hopital rule (lime!0
h(e)
e = h
0(0)) yields the desired
result.
On the other hand, from rI = (s'(0)pI ew L)1=X , with s a constant, we
have the equivalent expression sought. 2
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7.3 Early industrialization for the domestic market
The discussion in the previous exercise assumed that the price pI was de-
termined in the international market. But, if there is no developed world
market (or the country is the \rst comer"), industrial goods cannot be pur-
chased abroad, but must be produced internally when the demand arises.
Production diversies in parallel with consumption. Assuming that the
no-education condition holds, the economy would now be described by the
following equations:
 Demand for industrial goods:
pIy
I = (1  )I3(iK  ei2)
where the notation is as before, and iK is the income of the land-
lord/capitalists.
 Income of agents K:
iK = f(XA) rI(pI ; ew; h = 0)XI
where, as before, XA;XI are the capital stocks in each sector, rI the
rate of return of capital in manufacturing.
 Supply of good I:
yI = yI(pI; ew; h)
 Allocation of capital:
f 0(XA) = rI(pI ; ew; 0)
 Allocation of bequests:
b = XA +XI
 Employment in manufacturing:
L = XI l(pI; ew; h)
where l is the labor/capital ratio.
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 Dynamics of bequests:
bo = (iK  ei2) +ebo2
The system can be completed by specifying the choices on education,
which could be determined, as before, by a government that optimizes on
behalf of group K.
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